Introduction

In May 2026, CMA CGM, the world's third-largest container shipping company, announced the suspension of accepting new bookings for Cuba-bound cargo. This decision triggered a chain reaction across the international logistics industry. As one of the most active liner companies in the Caribbean region, CMA CGM's adjustment of route布局 (layout) marks the entry of the regional ocean freight and air freight logistics landscape into a phase of deep restructuring. This article provides a systematic analysis of the full picture of this event and its profound impact on the freight forwarding service market from four dimensions: route disruption background, logistics impact assessment, alternative routing solutions, and regional supply chain reconfiguration.

I. Event Details and Official Statement

1.1 CMA CGM Cuba Route Overview

CMA CGM has long operated container liner services for Havana Port and Port-au-Prince, two major Cuban ports, providing approximately 6 weekly sailings at peak times, with combined capacity of approximately 2,400 TEU. In the Brazil-to-Caribbean direction, CMA CGM shared cabin space with Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, and other companies through a branch network, establishing relatively comprehensive regional coverage.

On May 15, 2026, CMA CGM announced through an official customer advisory: "Given the persistent challenges in the current commercial operating environment, our company will suspend accepting new Cuba-bound bookings starting June 1, 2026. Confirmed cabin space will be executed as planned until May 31." The advisory also indicated that the resumption date would be announced based on circumstances.

1.2 Analysis of Suspension Reasons

The industry widely believes that the following multiple factors combined are the core drivers behind CMA CGM's decision:

• Increased Sanctions Risk: The intensification of new U.S. economic and financial sanctions against Cuba has narrowed shipping companies' settlement channels, with USD settlement costs rising significantly, and some freight forwarding price inversion issues becoming prominent.
• Port Infrastructure Drag: Slow progress on Havana Port dredging projects, with draft restrictions preventing large container ships from berthing at full load, significantly increasing per-container operating costs.
• Continuous Cargo Volume Decline: Affected by Cuba's domestic economic situation, CMA CGM's Cuba route export container volume for all of 2025 decreased by approximately 34% year-on-year, with import volume down approximately 28%, and average vessel load factor dropping to below 45%.
• Capacity Reallocation Demand: With global container capacity tight in 2026, CMA CGM prioritizing scarce capacity allocation to high-utilization routes is a resource optimization decision based on commercial rationality.

II. Caribbean Logistics Impact Assessment

2.1 Capacity Gap Quantitative Analysis

Following CMA CGM's suspension of Cuba bookings, a significant capacity gap emerged in the Caribbean region's container capacity. Using2025 data as a baseline:

| Metric | Weekly Capacity Before CMA CGM Exit | Weekly Capacity After CMA CGM Exit | Gap Ratio |

|--------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------|

| Total Capacity (TEU) | Approximately 4,200 | Approximately 2,600 | Approximately 38% |

| Number of Sailings | Approximately 11 | Approximately 7 | Approximately 36% |

| Main Covered Ports | Havana, Santiago, Port-au-Prince | Port-au-Prince, Kingston | Partial Port Coverage Gap |

The main contradiction facing the freight forwarding service market in the short term is the superposition of suddenly contracted capacity and seasonal shipping demand peaks such as the Dragon Boat Festival, with spot market shipping cost facing upward pressure.

2.2 Stakeholder Impact Assessment

#### 2.2.1 Cuban Importers

Cuban importers are most directly impacted. Taking food and medicine两类 essential goods as examples:

• Time-Sensitive Goods (fresh produce, cold chain food): Following the discontinuation of CMA CGM's weekly service, they need to turn to Spanish shipping company Boluda or regional small ship owners, with shipping times potentially extending by 3 to 5 days.
• Industrial Manufactured Goods: High-value-added goods such as auto parts and home appliance components face dual pressures of increased freight and uncertain space availability, with transportation cost optimization space significantly compressed.

#### 2.2.2 Central American Transit Trade

Historically, Cuba served a transit trade function between certain Central American countries and Brazil and Venezuela. Following CMA CGM's exit, transit routes have been blocked, and relevant traders are actively seeking alternatives:

• Kingston Port, Jamaica: As a regional hub, it is承接 (absorbing) some cargo originally transiting through Cuba, but storage and customs clearance capabilities need time to improve.
• Dominican Republic: Some cargo owners have shifted Port-au-Prince business to Santo Domingo port in this country, but port efficiency gaps compared to Cuba are significant.

#### 2.2.3 Alternative Shipping Companies

CMA CGM's exit has provided market space for competing operators:

| Shipping Company | Current Capacity Investment | Response Strategy |

|-----------------|----------------------------|------------------|

| Seaboard Marine | Approximately 800 TEU weekly | Increase sailing frequency, strengthen Havana direct service |

| King Ocean Services | Approximately 400 TEU weekly | Add extra sailings Port-au-Prince to Miami |

| Hapag-Lloyd | Maintained status quo | No adjustment plans for now |

Notably, overall alternative capacity is limited, and most are smaller vessels, with comprehensive freight forwarding price competitiveness inferior to CMA CGM.

III. Alternative Routing Solutions Design

3.1 Short-Term Emergency Solutions

For current Cuban import demand, the following alternative routes have been widely adopted by freight forwarding service enterprises in practice:

• Route: Origin Port → Miami Port → Kingston Port (Jamaica) → Havana Port
• Transit Time: Approximately 14 to 18 days total (approximately 6 to 8 days longer than original direct sail)
• Cost: Approximately $180 to $240 increase per TEU
• Applicable Cargo: Non-urgent industrial products, basic food items

• Route: Origin Port → Kingston Port → Havana Port (tugboat connection)
• Transit Time: Approximately 12 to 16 days total
• Cost: Approximately $120 to $180 increase per TEU
• Applicable Cargo: Goods with moderate time requirements

3.2 Medium-to-Long-Term Route Restructuring

From the perspectives of shipping cost optimization and international logistics network resilience, medium-to-long-term systematic restructuring of Caribbean regional logistics routes should include:

• Multi-Port Diversification Strategy: Avoiding single hub dependency, establishing dynamic routing mechanisms among Kingston, Port-au-Prince, and Santo Domingo ports to disperse operational risks.
• Railway Auxiliary Channel: Exploring utilization of Mexican and Central American railway networks to transport some cargo via land channels to Caribbean coast ports, reducing dependence on single ocean freight routes.
• Regional Warehouse Pre-Positioning: Establishing distribution warehouses in Kingston targeting the Cuban market, splitting large-volume transport into small-batch flexible distribution to shorten last-mile delivery time.

IV. Indirect Impact on Brazilian Logistics Market

4.1 Brazil-Caribbean Trade Links

Trade between Brazil and Cuba and the Caribbean region is centered on agricultural exports and industrial manufactured goods imports. Following CMA CGM's suspension of Cuba routes, Brazilian exporters face the following challenges:

• Sugar and Coffee Exports: Cuba is one of the important consumer markets for Brazilian sugar. Following route disruption, logistics routes need to detour through Central American ports, with per-ton sugar transportation cost expected to increase by approximately $15.
• Medical Device and Medicine Transit: Some Brazilian pharmaceutical enterprises distribute to Caribbean island nations through Cuba transit, with blocked routes requiring reconstruction of distribution networks.

4.2 Opportunities for Brazilian Shipping Enterprises

CMA CGM's exit has provided market entry opportunities for Brazilian domestic shipping enterprises. Wilson Sons, the Brazilian national shipping company, has announced plans to launch a fixed weekly service from Santos to Kingston in Q3 2026, with initial capacity of approximately 600 TEU, aiming to absorb part of the transit cargo demand flowing to the Caribbean.

Conclusion

CMA CGM's suspension of Cuba bookings is a commercially rational decision under multiple overlapping pressures, which in the short term will inevitably trigger international logistics capacity tightness and freight forwarding price fluctuations in the Caribbean region. However, crises often contain opportunities for change—this event is forcing the regional logistics network to accelerate evolution toward multi-hub diversification, digital visibility, and multimodal transportation. For Brazilian exporters and global freight forwarding service providers, proactively adapting to route restructuring and optimizing supply chain布局 (layout) is key to maintaining competitiveness in turbulent times. In the long run, the restructuring of the Caribbean logistics landscape will promote rebalancing of regional trade flows, with new logistics nodes and service providers expected to stand out in this process.